THE CRESCENT RISING

From the fall of Constantinople in 1453 to the accession of Sultan Mehmed II, the Ottomans had been in continuous conflict with the Christian powers of Europe, for the most part with stunningly successful results. They had continued to spread the influence of Islam into the Balkans and around the Mediterranean Sea; Serbia (1459), Bosnia (1463), Moldavia (1504), Syria (1516), Egypt (1517), Cyrenaica (1521), Rhodes (1522), Hungary (1541), Transylvania (1541), Tripoli (1551), Cyprus (1571) and Tunisia (1574) had all succumbed to the might of Ottoman foreign policy. Successes had been few and far between for the Christian states of Europe; Malta (1565), Lepanto (1571) and the first Siege of Vienna (1529) were the few notable moments when Ottoman aggrandisement had been stopped in its tracks.

The first 50 years of the 17th century in Europe were dominated by the Thirty Years’ War (1618–48) and the western European powers were fortunate that at this time the quality of Ottoman leadership started to decline. In 1603, Sultan Mehmed III died and his 14-year-old son Ahmed succeeded him. Ahmed I proved to be a less than inspiring leader, and if it had not been for the election of the pro-Ottoman Stefan Bocksai as the prince of Transylvania in 1601, it is doubtful if the Ottomans would have had their final fanfare of successes in 1605 when the fortresses of Veszprém, Visegrad and Gran were retaken. The Austrians and the Ottomans were exhausted after 13 years of war, and in 1606 the Peace of Zsitva–Torok was signed. Ahmed died in 1617 aged only 28, and as his son Osman was a minor, his brother Mustafa succeeded him. Mustafa showed himself to be completely inept as a ruler, and in 1618 Osman followed in his father’s footsteps and ascended to the throne aged only 14. The young Sultan became Osman II, and within two years was at war with Poland. As so often in Ottoman wars with the European powers, it was a Christian vassal of the Sultan who was the catalyst for the conflict. On this occasion in 1620 it was the Protestant Prince of Transylvania, Bethlen Gabor. In 1618, Gabor had sided with the cause of the rebellion in Bohemia that was to escalate into the Thirty Years’ War. Part of his campaign was to besiege Vienna, which obligated Sigismund III of Poland to come to the aid of his brother-in-law, the emperor. The Polish king was thwarted by the Polish diet (parliament), who refused to allow the use of Polish troops. In order to honour an agreement with the emperor signed in 1613, Sigismund was forced to hire, out of his own purse, mercenaries, who went on to defeat Gabor in 1619.

An opportunity for revenge came in 1620, when Osman II, with the desire to emulate Suleiman the Magnificent, went to war with Poland. Gabor, smarting from his defeat at Vienna in 1619, had been conspiring with the sultan for revenge, and their gaze rested on Gratiani, the ruler of Moldovia, who was friendly to Poland. Osman wore his ancestor’s magnificent armour and at the head of the Ottoman army invaded Moldovia, who appealed to Poland for help. With Gratiani promising 25,000 troops, a Polish army under Hetman (commander) Zolkiewski of 8,000 marched into Moldovia; a mere 600 Moldovians rallied to the Polish banners. The Poles were heavily outnumbered, and having withstood 11 days of attacks at his camp at Cecora on the Prut River from the Ottoman army under Iskander Pasha, Zolkiewski ordered a retreat. The Poles carried out one of the most difficult military operations, a withdrawal in contact. After eight days of continuous attacks, discipline in the Polish army broke down and disaster ensued. The Ottomans decisively defeated Zolkiewski, whose head was sent to Sultan Osman II as a trophy.